Peer-to-peer systems are vulnerable to attrition attacks that include both traditional, network-level denial of service attacks as well as application-level attacks in which malign peers conspire to waste loyal peers' resources. We describe a set of defenses for the LOCKSS digital preservation system that help ensure that applicationlevel attacks even from powerful adversaries are less effective than network-level attacks, and that network-level attacks must be intense, wide-spread, and prolonged to impair the system.
Introduction
Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are among the most difficult for distributed systems to resist. Distinguishing legitimate requests for service from the attacker's requests can be difficult, and devoting substantial effort to doing so can easily be self-defeating. The term DoS was introduced by Needham [31] with a broad meaning but over time it has come to mean high-bit-rate network-level flooding attacks [22] that rapidly degrade the usefulness of the victim system. We use the term attrition to make clear our equal concern with moderate-or low-bit-rate application-level attacks that gradually impair the victim system over a long period.
The experiments described in this paper are aimed at equipping the LOCKSS 1 digital preservation system to resist attrition attacks. LOCKSS is a peer-to-peer (P2P) system now in production use at about 80 libraries worldwide. About 50 publishers have endorsed the system. It reduces the cost and increases the reliability of digital preservation. Cooperation among peers eliminates the need for backup and greatly reduces other operator interventions while providing robust defenses against accident or attack.
The goal of a LOCKSS peer's participation is to achieve regular reassurance that its copy of some given content agrees with the consensus of the peers, and if it does not, to obtain the needed repair. The goal of an attrition adversary is to prevent loyal peers from successfully determining the consensus of their peers or from obtaining requested repairs for long enough for natural "bit-rot" to corrupt the loyal peers' content. Other attrition attacks may be inconvenient but have no lasting effect on the system.
We find that the LOCKSS P2P architecture, with no central control or administration, provides a suitable basis for resisting attrition attacks. It can arrange that no peer is significantly more important than another, depriving the adversary of the opportunity to focus an attack on a small number of critical peers. A lack of central control prevents the locus of control from being such a critical point. The lack of any basis for trust between peers prevents failures from propagating via trust relationships. The potential for diversity of implementation among the peers can prevent catastrophic common-mode failures.
While none of the LOCKSS attrition defenses is wholly new, we believe the combination of techniques is novel and effective. They include effort balancing to ensure that requesting a service requires at least as must effort as supplying the service, rate limitation to ensure suppliers of services are not overwhelmed by requests for those services, desynchronization of the suppliers of services to ensure that progress can be made even if some suppliers are too busy at any particular time, and redundancy to ensure the attacker cannot disable the system by targeting a small number of peers. Redundancy and rate limitation have already proved useful in defending LOCKSS against other attacks that seek to corrupt content throughout the system in a coherent way [29] . The motivation for this current work was a lingering vulnerability to attrition; an application-level attack from about 50 malign peers could prevent 1000 loyal peers from auditing and repairing their content. While still defending against other attacks, these defenses now ensure that application-level attacks, no matter how powerful the attacker, do not prevent audits. They also ensure that even network-level attacks that continuously prevent all communication between a majority of the peers must last for months to affect the system significantly.
Our broad definition of attrition allows a wide range of attack techniques. We analyze them by modeling the system as a set of filters that reject some messages and admit others. Successive filters are increasingly costly for the recipient to apply but raise the average generation cost of the admitted messages correspondingly. We believe this filter model may be useful for analyzing the attrition resistance and costs of other systems as well.
In the rest of this paper, we first describe our application. We continue by outlining how we would like this application to behave in the face of different levels of attrition attacks. We give an overview of the LOCKSS protocol and describe how it incorporates the set of attrition defenses that provide the system with the desired behavior under attack. We then explain the results of a systematic exploration of simulated attacks against the resulting design.
The Application
In this section, we provide an overview of the LOCKSS system. First, we outline the problem of digital preservation for academic publishing. Then we present the abstract design problem and the guiding design goals that informed our approach.
The LOCKSS system was designed [34] to provide librarians with the tools they need to preserve their community's access to materials published on the web, initially academic journals. Academic publishing has migrated to the Web [40] , placing society's scientific and cultural heritage at a variety of risks such as confused provenance, accidental editing by the publisher, storage corruption and failed backups, government or corporate censorship, vandalism and deliberate re-writing of history.
Engineering a solution to this problem involves meeting six stringent requirements. First, any solution must accommodate the interests of publishers; under US law [15] copyright content can only be copied and manipulated with the owner's permission. It is not in publishers' interest to provide, for example, no-fee access or digital signatures on content. Second, a solution must be extremely cheap in terms of hardware, operation costs, and human expertise; for example few libraries could afford a solution involving handling and securely storing off-line media [3] , but most can afford a few cheap off-the-shelf PCs with sufficient storage for tens of thousands of journal-years. Third, the existence of cheap, reliable storage cannot be assumed; all affordable storage is unreliable [21] . Fourth, a solution must have a long time horizon; for example, auditing content against stored digital signatures assumes not only that the cryptosystem will remain unbroken, but also that the secrecy and integrity of the keys is guaranteed to be preserved for decades. Fifth, a solution must anticipate adversaries capable of powerful attacks sustained over long periods; it must withstand these attacks, or at least degrade slowly and gracefully while providing unambiguous warnings [33] . Sixth, a solution must not require a central locus of control or administration which would provide adversaries with a target for technical or legal attacks. Despite these constraints, the fact that our application does not require speed makes our problem easier.
Two different architectures have been proposed for preserving Web journals. On one hand, trusted third party archives require publishers to grant the archive permission, under certain circumstances, to re-publish their content. It has proved effectively impossible to persuade publishers to do so. On the other hand, in the LOCKSS system, publishers need only grant a subscribing library permission to supply its own content replica to its local readers; this has been the key to commercial publishers' willingness to endorse LOCKSS. It is thus important to note that the design goal of LOCKSS is not to minimize the number of replicas that ensures content safety, but rather to minimize the per-replica cost of maintaining a large number of replicas. We trade extra replicas for fewer lawyers, an easy decision given their relative costs.
The LOCKSS design is extremely conservative, making few assumptions about the infrastructure. Although we believe this is appropriate for a digital preservation system, less conservative assumptions are certainly possible. Taking increased risk can increase the amount of content that can be preserved with given computational power. For example, the availability of limited amounts of reliable, write-once memory would allow audits against local hashes, the availability of a reliable public key infrastructure might allow publishers to sign their content and peers to audit against the signatures, and so on. However, even if the system incorporated these optimizations, their underlying assumptions could be violated silently at any time; the write-once memory might be corrupted or mishandled and a private key might leak. Thus, even designs with less conservative assumptions would need the audit mechanism as a fallback. The more individual peer operators can do to avoid local failures the better the system works, but our conservative design principles lead us to focus on mechanisms that minimize dependence on these efforts.
Given these requirements, in this paper we tackle the "abstract" problem of auditing and repairing a population of peer replicas in the face of an attrition attack.
Our first goal is to preserve the long-term integrity of the replicated document, by ensuring that a majority of all replicas reflect the correct document contents; our second goal is to preserve access to a correct replica at each peer site for as much of the time as possible, in the face of local storage failures and attacks.
We can map the digital preservation problem described above to this abstract problem, by considering the population of peer libraries that carry a particular archival unit (AU) -for instance, a year's run of an online journal. These peers start out with individual replicas of that AU, originally obtained by crawling the publisher's web site but no longer available there. Each has the publisher's permission to provide repairs and serve their local community, but not others, with the AU. In the rest of this paper we refer to AUs, peers, and replicas, rather than journals and libraries.
System Behavior and Modeling
A traditional DoS adversary mounts his attacks by limiting his victims' inbound or outbound traffic. Our adversary has additional capabilities: total information awareness, in that he can instantaneously control and monitor all of his resources; unconstrained identities, in that he can purchase or spoof unlimited network identities; insider information, in that he has complete knowledge of his victims' system parameters and resource commitments; masquerading, in that loyal peers cannot distinguish him from other loyal peers, as long as he follows the LOCKSS protocol; and unlimited computational resources, though he is polynomially bounded in his computations.
The adversary employs these capabilities in effortless and effortful attacks. An effortless attack requires no measurable computational effort from the attacker and includes the traditional DoS attacks such as floods of garbage packets aimed at congesting a peer's network connection, which we call pipe stoppage. An effortful attack requires the attacker to invest in the system and therefore requires computational effort.
We evaluate the effects of these attacks by modeling a peer's processing of inbound messages as a series of filters, each costing a certain amount to apply. A message rejected by a filter has no further effect on the peer, allowing us to estimate the cost of eliminating whole classes of messages from further consideration. Each filter increases the amount of effort the victim invests in defending itself, but limits the effectiveness of some adversary capability.
The bandwidth filter models a peer's network connection. It represents the physical limits on the rates of inbound messages that an adversary can force upon his victims. The admission control filter takes inbound messages at the maximum rate supported by the bandwidth filter and further limits them to match the maximum rate at which protocol traffic is expected from legitimate senders. This curbs the adversary's use of unlimited identities and prevents him from applying potentially unconstrained computational resources upon a single victim. The effort balancing filter ensures that effort imposed upon a victim by ostensibly legitimate traffic is balanced by correspondingly high effort borne by the attacker, making it costly for a resource-constrained adversary to masquerade as a legitimate peer.
Our objective is to make attacking the bandwidth filter the adversary's most effective strategy. Such attacks, e.g., traditional DDoS attacks, are the most detectable. As we show, the adversary must maintain such an attack for a long time and over a large fraction of the peer population to degrade the system significantly. In the absence of such highly detectable attacks, the adversary can only attack the system via the protocol and, as we show in Section 7, his most effective strategy there is to emulate legitimacy. Our results suggest that even this most effective of his protocol strategies has minimal impact on the utility of our system.
The LOCKSS Replica Auditing and Repair Protocol
The LOCKSS audit process operates as a sequence of "opinion polls" conducted by every peer on each of its AU replicas. At intervals, a peer (the poller) constructs a sample of the peer population preserving an AU and invites those peers as voters into a poll. Each voter individually hashes a poller-supplied nonce and its replica of the AU to produce a fresh vote, which the poller tallies. If the poller is outvoted in a landslide (e.g., it disagrees with 80% of the votes), it assumes its replica is corrupt and repairs it from a disagreeing voter. The roles of poller and voter are distinct, but they are played interchangeably by every peer in the system. The general structure of a poll follows the timeline of Figure 1 . A poll consists of two phases: the vote solicitation phase and the evaluation phase. In the vote solicitation phase the poller requests and obtains votes from as many voters in its sample of the population as possible. Then the poller begins the evaluation phase, during which it compares these votes to its own replica, one hashed content block at a time, and tallies them. If the hashes disagree the poller may request repair blocks from its voters and re-evaluate the block. If in the eventual tally, after any repairs, the poller agrees with the landslide majority, it sends a receipt to each of its voters and immediately starts a new poll. Peers interleave making progress on their own polls and voting in other peers' polls, spreading each poll over a long period (typically 3 months) chosen so that polls on a given AU occur at a rate much higher than the rate of "bit rot."
Vote Solicitation
The outcome of a poll is determined by the votes of the inner circle peers, sampled at the start of the poll by the poller from its reference list for the AU. The reference list contains mostly peers that have agreed with the poller in recent polls on the AU, and a few peers from the poller's friends list, a static list determined by the poller's operator. A poll is considered successful if its result is based on a minimum number of inner circle votes, the quorum, which is typically 10, but may change according to the application's needs for fault tolerance. To ensure that a poll is likely to succeed, a poller invites into its poll a larger inner circle than the quorum (typically, twice as large). If at first try, an inner circle peer fails to respond to an invitation, or responds with a refusal, the poller proceeds with a solicitation towards a different voter, but comes back and tries the refusing peer again later.
An individual vote solicitation consists of four messages (see Figure 1 ): Poll, PollAck, PollProof, and Vote. Note that for the duration of a poll, a poller establishes an encrypted TLS session with each voter individually, using an anonymous Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Every protocol message is conveyed over this TLS session, either maintaining the underlying TCP connection from message to message, or establishing a new TCP connection and resuming the TLS session over it. We omit the details in this paper.
The Poll message invites a voter to participate in a poll on the given AU (whose identifier is included in the message). The invited peer responds with a PollAck message, indicating either a refusal, which concludes its participation in the current poll, or an acceptance of the invitation, if it can compute a vote within a predetermined time allowance. The voter commits and reserves local resources to that effect. The PollProof message supplies the voter with a random nonce to be used during vote construction. To compute its vote, the voter uses a cryptographic hash function (e.g., SHA-1) to hash the nonce supplied by the poller, followed by its replica of the AU, block by block. The vote consists of the running hashes produced at each block boundary. Finally, the voter sends its vote back to the poller in a Vote message.
All four of these messages also contain proofs of computational effort, such as those introduced by Dwork et al. [14] , sufficient to ensure that, at every protocol stage, the requester of a service has more invested in the exchange than the supplier of the service. We describe how this provable effort helps us defend against attrition attacks in Section 5.1.
Peer Discovery
The poller uses the vote solicitation phase of a poll not only to obtain votes for the current poll, but also to discover new peers for its reference list from which it can solicit inner circle votes in future polls.
Discovery is effected via sets of nominations included in the Vote messages of individual votes. A voter picks a random subset of its current reference list peers, which it includes in its Vote message. The poller accumulates these nominations until it concludes soliciting votes from its inner circle. Then, the poller chooses a random sample of all nominations from its inner-circle voters as its outer circle. It proceeds to solicit regular votes from its outer circle peers in a manner identical to that used for inner circle peers.
The purpose of the votes obtained from outer circle voters is to prove the "good behavior" of newly discovered peers. Those who perform correctly, by supplying votes that agree with the prevailing outcome of the poll, are added into the poller's reference list at the conclusion of the poll; the outcome of the poll is computed only from inner-circle votes.
Vote Evaluation
Once the poller has accumulated all votes that it could obtain from inner and outer circle voters, it begins the evaluation phase of a poll. During this phase, the poller computes, in parallel, all block hashes that each voter should have computed, if that voter's replica agreed with the poller's, starting with the nonce chosen by the poller for each voter. A vote is said to agree with the poller on a block if the hash in the vote and that computed by the poller are the same.
For each hash computed by the poller for an AU block, there are three possibilities: First, the landslide majority of inner-circle votes (e.g., 80%) agree with the poller; in this case, the poller considers the audit successful up to this block and proceeds with the next one. Second, the landslide majority of inner-circle votes disagree with the poller; in this case, the poller regards its own replica of the AU as damaged. It repairs it by obtaining the replica block from one of the disagreeing voters (via the RepairRequest and Repair messages), and it reevaluates the block hoping to find itself in the landslide majority, as above. Third, the agreeing and disagreeing votes on the block are close to the middle (e.g., 45%-55%); the poller deems the poll inconclusive, raising an alarm that requires attention from a human operator, as described in previous work [29] .
Throughout the evaluation phase, the poller may also decide to obtain a repair from a random voter, even if one is not required (i.e., even if the corresponding block met with a landslide agreement). The purpose of such frivolous repairs is to prevent targeted free-riding via the refusal of repairs; voters are expected to supply a small number of repairs once they commit to participate in a poll, and are penalized otherwise (Section 4.4).
If the poller hashes all AU blocks without raising an alarm, the poller concludes the poll by sending an evaluation receipt to each voter (with an EvaluationReceipt message), indicating that it will not be requesting any more repairs. The poller then updates its reference list by removing all voters whose votes determined the poll outcome and by inserting all agreeing outer-circle voters and some peers from the friends list (for details see [29] ). The poller then restarts a poll on the same AU, scheduling it to conclude an inter-poll interval (typically 3 months) into the future.
First-Hand Reputation
Peers locally maintain and use first-hand reputation for other peers they encounter though the protocol. We use two types of such reputation. The first is the reference list they sample for the inner circle. Although candidate peers for inclusion in a poller's reference list (i.e., the outer circle) are nominated by the inner circle voters, the poller only adds them to its reference list after it has itself verified their recent, unforgeable investment in the system, in the form of agreeing votes in a poll. The reference list thus helps pollers by listing peers whose opinions on an AU are of high quality and who are therefore worth soliciting for votes on that AU. Reference list entries expire after a few polls, increasing the effort required of attackers hoping to populate the lists with malign peers.
The second form of first-hand reputation is the knownpeers list, which helps a voter decide which pollers' solicitations to accept by tracking the other peers' level of participation in the protocol. A peer P maintains an entry in its known-peers list for every peer it has encountered in the past. The entry holds a reputation grade for the peer, which is one of three values: debt, even, or credit. A debt grade means that the peer has supplied P with fewer votes than P has supplied it. A credit grade means P has supplied the peer with fewer votes that the peer has supplied P . An even grade means that P and the peer are even in their recent exchanges of votes. Entries in the known peers list do not expire.
In a LOCKSS transaction, both the poller and a voter modify the grade they have assigned to each other depending on their respective behaviors. If the voter supplies a valid vote and valid repairs for any blocks the poller requests, then the poller increases the grade it has assigned to the voter (from debt to even, from even to credit, or from credit to credit) and the voter decreases the grade it has assigned to the poller. If either the poller or the voter misbehave (e.g., the voter commits to supplying a vote but does not, or the poller does not send a valid evaluation receipt), then the other peer decreases its grade to debt.
Voters use this coarse-grained reputation scheme to perform admission control on incoming Poll messages. A voter subjects to a random drop rate those poll invitations that arrive from pollers with a debt grade or without a grade at all (i.e., unknown pollers), but immediately considers invitations from pollers with an even or credit grade. To discourage identity whitewashing the drop rate imposed on unknown pollers is higher than that imposed on known in-debt pollers. Furthermore, invitations from unknown or in-debt pollers are subject to a rigid rate limit; after it admits one such invitation for consideration, a voter enters a refractory period during which it automatically rejects all invitations from unknown or indebt pollers. This is similar to the reciprocative strategy of Feldman et al. [16] , in that it penalizes peers who do not reciprocate, i.e., do not supply votes in return for the votes they receive.
A reputation system must accommodate peer discovery and facilitate the initial operation of new but loyal peers. To do so, we allow voters to introduce others to a poller in the same mechanism as that used by the nomination process, described in Section 4.2. A poller chooses at random half of the peer identities in each Vote message to process as nominations; it processes the remainder as introductions. An introduced peer is treated as a known peer with an even grade. A voter therefore immediately admits for consideration a poll invitation from such a peer. However, at most one introduction is honored per (validly voting) voter, and unused introductions do not accumulate.
LOCKSS Defenses
Here we outline the attrition defenses of the LOCKSS protocol: effort balancing, rate limitation, desynchronization, and redundancy.
Effort Balancing
If a peer must expend more effort to react to a protocol message than the sender of that message did to generate and transmit it, then an attrition attack need consist only of a flow of ostensibly valid such messages, enough to exhaust the victim peer's resources.
We adapt the ideas of pricing via processing [14] to prevent this by effort balancing our protocol. We inflate the cost of a request by requiring it to include a proof of computational effort sufficient to ensure that the total cost of generating the request exceeds the cost to the supplier of both verifying the effort proof and satisfying the request. We favor Memory-Bound Functions (MBF) [13] rather than CPU-bound schemes such as "client puzzles" [11] for this purpose, because the spread in memory system performance is smaller than that of CPU performance [12] .
Effort balancing in the context of multi-step protocols can defend against three types of attack patterns: first, desertion strategies in which the attacker stops taking part some way through the protocol, having spent less effort in the process than the effort inflicted upon his victim; second, reservation strategies that cause the victim to schedule or commit resources that the attacker does not use, preventing them from being used for other, useful tasks; and, third, wasteful strategies in which service is obtained but the result is not "consumed" by the requester as expected by the protocol, in an attempt to minimize the attacker's effort.
Pollers could mount a desertion attack by cheaply soliciting an expensive vote. To prevent this, LOCKSS requires the poller to include provable effort in its vote solicitation messages (Poll and PollProof) that in total exceeds the effort required by the voter to verify that effort and to produce the requested vote. Computing a vote amounts to fetching an AU replica from disk, hashing it, and shipping back to the poller one hash per block in the Vote message.
Voters could mount a desertion attack by cheaply generating a bogus vote in response to an expensive solicitation, returning garbage instead of block hashes in the hope of wasting not merely the poller's solicitation effort but also its effort to verify the hashes. In LOCKSS, the poller evaluates the vote one block at a time; it costs the effort of hashing one block to detect that the vote disagrees with its own AU replica, which may mean either that the vote is bogus, or that the poller's and voter's replicas of the AU differ in that block. The voter must therefore include in the Vote message provable effort sufficient to cover the cost of hashing a single block and of verifying this effort proof, and the poller must include in the solicitation messages enough effort to cover the generation of this proof.
Pollers
Pollers could mount a wasteful attack if they could solicit expensive votes and then discarded them unevaluated. To prevent this we require the poller, after evaluating a vote, to supply the voter with an unforgeable evaluation receipt proving that it evaluated the vote; we call this technique compliance enforcement. Voters generate votes and pollers evaluate them using very similar processes: generating or validating effort proofs and hashing blocks of the local AU replica. Conveniently, generating a proof of effort using our chosen MBF mechanism also generates about 160 bits of unforgeable byproduct. The voter remembers the byproduct; the poller uses it as the evaluation receipt to send to the voter. If the receipt matches the voter's remembered byproduct the voter knows the poller performed the necessary effort, regardless of whether the poller was loyal or malicious.
In Section 7.3 we show how our defenses fare against such attacks mounted by pollers, evaluating the success of an adversary who defects at different key points in the protocol, seeking to maximize the defenders' effort as compared to the attacker's. We omit the evaluation of effort balancing attacks by voters, since they are rendered ineffective by the rate limits we describe next.
Rate Limitation
Without limits on the rate at which they attempt to service requests, peers can be overwhelmed by floods of ostensibly valid requests. Rate Limitation suggests that peers should satisfy requests no faster than necessary rather than as fast as possible. Because readers access only their local LOCKSS peer, the audit and repair protocol is not subject to the users' unpredictable request patterns and can proceed at its own steady pace, making it an interesting test-bed for rate limitation.
We identify three possible attacks based on deviation from the necessary rate of polling. A poll rate adversary would seek to trick victims into either decreasing (e.g., by causing back-off behavior) or increasing (e.g., in an attempt to recover from a failed poll) their rate of calling polls. A poll flood adversary would seek, under a multitude of identities, to invite victims into as many frivolous polls as possible hoping to crowd out the legitimate poll requests and thereby reduce the ability of loyal peers to audit and repair their content. Note that a free-rider, a selfish peer that calls polls but does not vote in others' polls, is a mild form of this adversary. A vote flood adversary would seek to supply as many bogus votes as possible hoping to exhaust loyal pollers' resources in useless but expensive proofs of invalidity.
Peers defend against all these adversaries by setting their rate limits autonomously and not varying them in response to other peers' actions. Responding to adversity (inquorate polls or perceived contention) by calling polls more frequently could aggravate the problem; backing off to a lower rate of polls would achieve the adversary's aim of slowing the detection and repair of damage. Both would violate the Hippocratic principle of "first, do no harm" [20] . Because peers do not react, the poll rate adversary has no opportunity to attack; we do not evaluate this attack strategy further. Though an individual peer might, absent manual intervention, take several inter-poll intervals to recover from a catastrophic storage failure, the system as a whole is free from opportunities for an adversary to coerce a reduction in throughput, such as those described by Kuzmanovic et al. [25] in the context of TCP retransmission timers.
The poll flood adversary tries to get victims to overcommit their resources or, failing that, to commit excessively to the adversary. To prevent over-commitment peers maintain a task schedule of their promises to perform effort, both to generate votes for others and to call polls on their own behalf. If the effort of computing the vote solicited by an incoming Poll message cannot be accommodated in the schedule the invitation is rejected. Preventing excessive commitment to the adversary is the task of the admission control mechanism of Section 4.4; it both decreases the probability of, and limits the rate of, acceptance of invitations from unknown peers or those that have failed to reciprocate the votes they have received. We evaluate this attack strategy in Section 7.2.
The vote flood adversary is hamstrung by the fact that votes can be supplied only in response to an invitation by the putative victim poller, and pollers solicit votes at a fixed rate. Unsolicited votes are ignored.
Desynchronization
The desynchronization defense requires that measures such as randomization be applied to avoid the kind of inadvertent synchronization that has been observed in many distributed systems. Examples include TCP sender windows at bottleneck routers, clients waiting for a busy server, and periodic routing messages [17] . Peer-to-peer systems in which a peer requesting service must find more than one peer simultaneously available to supply that service (e.g., in a read-one-write-many fault-tolerant system [27] ) may encounter this problem. If they do, even absent an attack, moderate levels of peer busyness can prevent the system from delivering services. A poll flood attacker in this situation may only need to increase peer busyness slightly to have a large effect.
Simulations of poll flood attacks on an earlier version of the protocol [28] showed this effect. Loyal pollers were at a great disadvantage against the attrition adversary because they needed to find a quorum of voters who could simultaneously vote on an AU. The voters must be chosen at random to make directed subversion hard for the adversary; they must have free resources at the specified time, in the face of resource contention from other peers who are also competing for voters on the same or other AUs at the same time. The adversary has no such requirements; he can find and invite an individual victim into a futile poll.
We now avoid this problem by soliciting votes individually rather than synchronously, extending the period during which a quorum of votes can be collected before they are all evaluated. A poll is thus a sequence of twoparty interactions rather than a single multi-party interaction.
Redundancy
If the survival of, or access to, an AU relied only on a few replicas, an attrition attack could focus on those replicas, cutting off the communication between them needed for audit and repair. Each LOCKSS peer preserving an AU maintains its own replica and serves it only to its local clients for reasons having nothing to do with reliability or attack resistance, but rather with legal tractability and customer acceptance. Fortunately, this massive level of redundancy helps resist attacks in two ways. First, it ensures that a successful attrition attack must target the majority of the replicas, typically a large number of peers. Second, it forces the attrition attack to suppress the communication or activity of the targeted peers continuously for a long period. Unless the attack does both, the targeted peers recover by auditing and repairing themselves from the untargeted peers, as shown in Section 7.1. This is because massive redundancy allows peers at each poll to choose a sample of their reference list that is much bigger than the quorum and continue to solicit votes from them at intervals for the whole duration of a poll (typically 3 months) until the voters accept. Further, the fact peers call polls much faster than the rate at which they suffer undetected damage provides redundancy in time; an individual failed poll has little effect on the overall performance of the system.
Simulation
In this section we give details about the metrics we evaluate and the simulation environment.
Evaluation Metrics
We use five metrics to measure the effectiveness of our defenses against the attrition adversary: preservation failure probability, access failure probability, delay ratio, coefficient of friction, and cost ratio.
Preservation Failure Probability. The most serious attack on LOCKSS is one that corrupts irrecoverably the data being preserved. This is achieved, for instance, if a majority of the replicas of at least one AU is corrupt. An attrition adversary could attempt this goal with an attack that disables the audit and repair mechanism for long enough for natural "bit rot" to corrupt the data being preserved. However, this is not an effective attack for the attrition adversary, since it requires mounting a pipe stoppage attack on most of the replicas for many years. Other types of adversaries [29] are more likely to succeed toward this end with deliberate corruption of the content. Because this is not an effective attrition goal, the rest of our evaluation involves only the other four metrics.
Access failure probability: Another goal of the attrition adversary is to increase the probability of access failure, that is, of obtaining bad data when accessing a replica. This quantifies the success of an attrition attack. We compute this metric as the mean fraction of all replicas in the system that hold corrupt data over the course of an experiment.
Delay ratio: To measure the degradation an attrition adversary achieves, we compute the delay ratio as the mean time between successful polls at loyal peers with the system under attack divided by the same measurement without the attack.
Coefficient of friction: To measure the cost of an attack to loyal peers, we measure the coefficient of friction, defined as the effort expended by loyal peers per successful poll during an attack divided by their per-poll effort absent an attack.
Cost ratio: To compare the cost of an effortful attack to the adversary and to the defenders, we compute the cost ratio, which is the ratio of the effort expended during the attack by the attackers to that of the defenders.
Environment and Adversaries
We run our experiments using Narses [18] , a discreteevent simulator that exports a sockets-like network interface and provides facilities for modeling computationally expensive operations, such as computing MBF efforts and hashing documents. Narses allows experimenters to pick from a range of network models that trade off speed for accuracy. In this study we are mostly interested in the application level effects of an attrition attack, so we choose a simplistic network model that takes into account network delays but not congestion, except for the side-effects of artificial congestion used by a pipe stoppage adversary. The link bandwidths with which peers connect to the network are uniformly distributed among three choices: 1.5, 10, and 100 Mbps. Link latencies are uniformly distributed between 1 and 30 milliseconds.
Nodes in the system are divided into two categories: loyal peers and the adversary's minions. Loyal peers are uncompromised peers that execute the protocol correctly. Adversary minions are nodes that collaborate to execute the adversary's attack strategy.
We conservatively simulate the adversary as a cluster of nodes with as many IP addresses and as much compute power as needed. Each adversary minion has complete and instantaneous knowledge of all adversary state and has a magically incorruptible copy of all AUs. Other assumptions about our adversary less relevant to attrition can be found in [29] .
To prevent the attrition adversary from wasting any effort masquerading as a loyal peer by participating fully in the protocol, the adversary in these experiments is completely outside of the network of loyal peers. Loyal peers never ask the adversary's nodes to vote in polls and the adversary only asks loyal peers to vote in his polls. This contrasts with adversaries in previous work in which we evaluated other types of attacks [29] .
Simulation Parameters
We evaluate the preservation of a collection of AUs distributed among a population of loyal peers. For simplicity in this stage of our exploration, we assume that each AU contains 0.5 Gbytes (a large AU in practice). Each peer maintains 50 AUs, and all peers have replicas of all AUs; we do not yet simulate the diversity of local collections that we expect will evolve over time. These simplifications allow us to focus our attention on the common performance of our attrition resistance machinery, ignoring for the time being how that performance varies when AUs vary in size and popularity. Figure 2 : Without an attack, the access failure probability (y axis in log scale) for increasing mean inter-poll intervals (x axis) at varying mean times between storage failure (from 1 year to 5 years between failure per peer).
All simulations have a constant loyal peer population of 100 nodes and run for five simulated years, with 3 runs per data point. Each peer runs a poll on each of its AUs on average every 3 months. Each poll uses a quorum of 10 peers and considers landslide agreement as having a maximum of three disagreeing votes. These parameters were empirically determined from previous iterations of the deployed beta protocol. We set the fixed drop rate to be 0.90 for unknown peers and 0.80 for in-debt peers.
We are currently exploring this parameter space but use the following heuristics to help determine these values. Conservatively, the refractory period of one day is much shorter than it could be. It allows for invitations from unknown or in-debt peers to be accepted at roughly four times the average rate at which invitations from all peers must be accepted in a steady state. We set the fixed drop rate for unknown peers and the cost of verifying an introductory effort so that 1) the cumulative introductory effort expended by the adversary on dropped invitations is more than the voter's effort to consider the adversary's eventually admitted invitation and 2) even if invitations with bogus introductory efforts arrive from unknown or in-debt peers at the maximum rate of one every refractory period, the effort of detecting them as bogus is not a significant drain on the peer's resources.
Results
The probability of access failure summarizes the success of an attrition attack. We start by establishing a baseline rate of access failures absent an attack. Our simulated peers suffer random storage damage at rates of one block in 1 to 5 machine years (the LOCKSS beta test suggests that one such undetected occurrence every 5 machine years would be a gross overestimate). Figure 2 plots the access failure probability versus the mean The access failure probability (y axis in log scale) observed during repeated pipe stoppage attacks of varying duration (x axis in log scale), with coverage that ranges between 10% and 100%. The flat line at the bottom indicates the baseline access failure probability predicted by Figure 2 .
inter-poll interval and shows that as the mean inter-poll interval increases relative to the interval between storage failures, the access failure probability increases because damage takes longer to detect and repair. Note that in this and subsequent graphs, we offset data points by a small amount around the corresponding x-axis point, to enhance readability of the graphs.
Some inconclusive poll alarms are raised during these experiments, because of accumulated replica damage. When such an alarm occurs, a peer repairs its replica through a mechanism we describe elsewhere [29] . For the most extreme scenario we plot, with a 12-month poll interval and only 1 year between storage faults, absent an attack, one such alarm would be raised somewhere in the system every 45 days. With the conservative parameters we have chosen, the rate at which inconclusive poll alarms are raised is negligible; we did not observe any in our simulations. In Figure 2 , these parameter values correspond to an access failure probability of 5.4 × 10 −4 . We use this value as the baseline access failure probability in assessing the effect of the following simulated attrition adversaries.
We design the simulated adversaries using our filter model:
Bandwidth filter The adversary mounts effortless attacks that flood peers' networks, effectively shutting down their links to the outside world (Section 7.1).
Admission control filter
The adversary mounts effortless Sybil attacks (Section 7.2).
Effort-verification filter
The adversary mounts effortful attacks by defecting at various stages of the protocol exchange (Section 7.3). The delay ratio (y axis in log scale) imposed by repeated pipe stoppage attacks of varying duration (x axis in log scale) for varying coverage (between 10% and 100% of the population). Absent an attack, this metric has value 1. For each adversary we show the effect of increasing scales of attack on the access failure probability, and relevant supporting graphs including the delay ratio and the coefficient of friction. Note that the cost ratio is not meaningful for effortless attacks because the cost to the attacker is measured not in computational terms but in social terms (e.g., subversion of attacking hosts on the Internet and of edge networks).
Targeting the Bandwidth Filter
The "pipe stoppage" adversary models packet flooding or more sophisticated attacks [25] . This adversary suppresses all communication between some proportion of the total peer population (its coverage) and other peers. Each attack consists of a period of pipe stoppage (of varying durations up to twice the inter-poll interval, or 180 days) followed by a 30-day recuperation period during which communication is restored; this pattern is re- Figure 6 : The access failure probability (y axis in log scale) for attacks of increasing duration (x axis in log scale) by the admission control adversary with varying coverage (from 10% to 100% of the peer population). The flat line at the bottom indicates the baseline access failure probability from Figure 2 . peated for the entire simulated time of an experiment. Attack cycles begin at time 0. Figure 3 plots the access failure probability versus the attack duration for varying coverage values. We find that an attack pattern must cover at least 40% of the peers and last at least 10 days to have a significant effect on the access failure probability. It raises that probability to no more than 8.2 × 10 −3 , even when the pipe stoppage lasts for 6 months at 100% of the peer population, which is a very extreme case. Attack patterns for which pipe stoppage lasts 5 days or less, no matter the coverage, have no significant effect on the access failure probability. For any of these scenarios, the incidence of false alarms, caused by accumulated damage in the absence of audits, is low enough to be negligible. In the worst case we plot above, these attacks cause alarms to be raised somewhere in the system no more often than once every 500 days.
Figures 4 and 5 plot the delay ratio and coefficient of friction, respectively, versus attack duration for varying coverage values. We find that attacks must cover most or all peers and each time they occur they must last at least 30 days to raise the delay ratio by an order of magnitude. Similarly, the coefficient of friction during repeated attacks that last less than 30 days each is negligibly greater than 1; for longer attacks, the coefficient reaches 12.
The pipe stoppage attacks we simulate are formidable, and yet only manage to impact the access failure probability metric within tolerable limits for any service that is widely open to the Internet.
Targeting the Admission Control Filter
The admission control adversary aims to reduce the ability of victim peers to vote in polls called by others by triggering their refractory period as often as possible. This adversary sends cheap garbage invitations to a proportion of the total peer population (its coverage) for varying periods of time separated by a fixed recuperation period of 30 days. The adversary sends its invitations using poller addresses that are unknown to the victims. These, when eventually admitted, cause those victims to enter their refractory periods and drop subsequent invitations from all unknown and in-debt peers.
Figures 6 and 7 show that these attacks have little effect on the access failure probability or the delay ratio. The access failure probability is raised significantly to 0.001 only when the duration of the attack reaches the entire duration of our simulations (5 years) for full population coverage. At that attack intensity, loyal peers no longer admit poll invitations from unknown or indebt loyal peers, unless supported by an introduction. This causes discovery to operate more slowly; loyal peers waste a lot of their resources on introductory effort proofs that are summarily rejected by peers in their refractory period. This wasted effort is apparent in Figure 8 , which shows that when the attack is sustained for long periods of time with high population coverage, it can raise the cost of defending the system by almost 100%. Since this attack is effortless (at least in terms of computational power) and can be sustained indefinitely, deployed systems using our techniques must provision their resources to operate at no more than 50% of their maximum utilization. Note that techniques such as blacklisting, commonly used to defeat denial-of-service attacks in the context of email spam, or server selection [16] by which pollers only invite voters they believe will accept, could significantly reduce the friction caused by this attack. We have yet to explore whether these defenses would be compatible with our goal of also protecting against subversion attacks that operate by biasing the opinion poll sample towards corrupted peers [29] . Until then, we believe that the additional cost is well worth the trouble, as is certainly the case for our specific application.
Targeting the Effort Verification Filter
To attack filters downstream of the admission control filter the adversary must take part in the protocol to some extent. We consider a continuous attack by a Brute Force adversary with unlimited compute power whose goal is to send enough valid introductory efforts to get past the admission control filter's drop rate. To discourage whitewashing, admission control drops unknown peers at a higher rate than peers that are in debt. Thus, the adversary launches attacks from addresses that are in debt. We conservatively initialize all adversary addresses with a debt grade in admission control at all loyal peers, which Table 1 : The effect of the Brute Force adversary defecting at various points in the protocol on the coefficient of friction, the cost ratio, the delay ratio, and the access failure probability.
is the steady state reached by the adversary after attacking the system for long enough. We also give the adversary an oracle that allows him to inspect all the loyal peers' schedules. This prevents him from generating introductory effort that would be wasted because of scheduling conflicts. Once through admission control, the adversary can choose to defect at the various possible stages of the protocol exchange: after providing the introductory effort in the Poll message (INTRO) by never following up with a PollProof, after providing the remaining effort in the PollProof message (REMAINING) by never following up with an EvaluationReceipt, and not defecting at all (NONE). Table 1 shows that the unconstrained Brute Force adversary's most cost-effective strategy is to participate fully in the protocol; by doing so he is able to triple the cost to the loyal peers of preserving their content (coefficient of friction is 3.204). Doing so more than doubles the baseline probability of access failure (from 5 × 10 ). The attack costs the adversary as much as it costs the loyal peers to defend against it (cost ratio is 0.956). Fortunately, even this continuous attack from an unconstrained Brute Force adversary is unable to increase the access failure probability of the victims greatly; the rate limits prevent him from bringing his advantage in resources to bear. Similar behavior in our earlier work [29] prevented a different unconstrained adversary from modifying the content without detection.
In the analysis above, we assume that the brute force adversary employs attacking identities that remain in the debt grade of their victims. This is a conservative approach. Due to space constraints, we omit here experiments with an adversary similar to the brute force adversary, but who maintains his minions in the even or debt grades of his attackers. He does so by polling a victim only after he has supplied that victim with a vote, then defecting in any of the ways described above. He then recovers his grade at the victim by supplying an appropriate number of valid votes in succession. Each vote he supplies is used to introduce new minions that thereby bypass the victim's admission control before defecting. However, because this attack is effectively rate-limited by the rate at which the victim invites minions into its polls, the adversary is better off utilizing the brute force attack described in this section. We leave the details for an extended version of this paper.
Related Work
The protocol described here is derived from earlier work [29] in which we covered the background of the LOCKSS system. That protocol used redundancy, rate limitation, effort balancing, bimodal behavior (polls must be won or lost by a landslide) and friend bias (soliciting some percentage of votes from peers on the friends list) to prevent powerful adversaries from modifying the content without detection, or discrediting the intrusion detection system with false alarms. To mitigate its vulnerability to attrition, in this work we reinforce these defenses using first-hand reputation, admission control, and compliance enforcement, introduce desynchronization, and restructure votes to support a block-based repair mechanism that penalizes free-riding. In this section we list work that describes the nature and types of denial of service attacks, as well as related work that applies defenses similar to ours.
Our attrition adversary draws on a wide range of work in detecting [22] , measuring [30] , and combating [2, 26, 36, 37] network-level distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks capable of stopping traffic to and from our peers. This work observes that current attacks are not simultaneously of high intensity, long duration, and high coverage (many peers) [30] .
Redundancy is a key to survival during some DoS attacks, because pipe stoppage appears to other peers as a failed peer. Many systems use redundancy to mask storage failure [24] . Byzantine Fault Tolerance [6] is related to the LOCKSS opinion polling mechanism in its goal of managing replicas in the face of attack. It provides stronger guarantees but it is not as well adapted to large numbers of replicas. Routing along multiple redundant paths in Distributed Hash Tables (DHTs) has been suggested as a way of increasing the probability that a message arrives at its intended recipient despite nodes dropping messages due to malice [5] or pipe stoppage [23] .
Rate limits are effective in slowing the spread of viruses [38, 42] . They have also been suggested for limiting the rate at which peers can join a DHT [5, 41] as a defense against attempts to control part of the hash space. Our work suggests that DHTs will need to rate limit not only joins but also stores to defend against attrition attacks, and another study [35] suggests that the increased latency this will cause will not affect users' behavior.
Effort balancing is used as a defense against spam, which may be considered an application-level DoS attack and has received the bulk of the attention in this area. Our effort balancing defense draws on pricing-byprocessing concepts [14] . We measure cost by memory cycles [1, 13] ; others use CPU cycles [4, 14] or even Turing tests [39] . Crosby et al. [9] show that worstcase behavior of application algorithms can be exploited in application-level DoS attacks; our use of nonces and the bounded verification time of MBF avoid this risk. Our design constraints to avoid strong peer identities and avoid requiring infrastructure changes rule out many techniques for excluding malign peers such as Secure Overlay Services [23] .
Related to first-hand reputation is the use of gametheoretic analysis of peer behavior by Feldman et al. [16] to show that a reciprocative strategy in admission control policy can motivate cooperation among selfish peers.
Admission control has been used to improve the usability of overloaded services. For example, Cherkasova et al. [7] propose admission control strategies that help protect long-running web service sessions (i.e., related sequences of requests) from abrupt termination. In a P2P context, Daswani et al. [10] use admission control (and rate limiting) to mitigate the effects of a query flood attack against superpeers in unstructured file-sharing peerto-peer networks such as Gnutella.
Golle and Mironov [19] provide compliance enforcement in the context of distributed computation using a receipt technique similar to ours. Random auditing using challenges and hashing has been proposed [8, 41] as a means of enforcing trading requirements in some distributed storage systems.
In DHTs waves of synchronized routing updates caused by joins or departures cause instability during periods of high churn. Bamboo's [32] desynchronization defense using lazy updates is effective.
Future Work
Some over-provisioning of the system is both necessary (see Section 7.2) and natural. Using LOCKSS, a current low-cost PC would be 100% busy preserving 2.5TB of content, but would currently be unlikely to have more than 1TB of disk. Memory limitations in our simulation environment currently prevent us from fully simulating even 1TB of content per peer, but two lines of evidence suggest our simulations are nevertheless realistic. Artificially slowing the loyal peers by a factor of 10 results in graphs equivalent to 250GB per peer that are very similar to those above. We also see similar results by producing synthetic workloads that emulate the condition of the system when preserving 250GB per peer. Although these results are adequate for our specific engineering problem, we also plan to investigate higher ratios of storage to computational power.
We are currently exploring the admission control parameter space. In particular, we are studying the effects of varying the length of the refractory period, the drop rates for unknown and in-debt peers, and the effects of running the audit protocol over a larger number of AUs. As the number of AUs increases and peers are naturally more busy participating in polls, a longer refractory period may be more appropriate to allow loyal peers time to handle the load of polls called by other loyal peers.
We have two immediate goals for future work. First, we observe that although the protocol is symmetric the attrition adversary's use of it is asymmetric. It may be that adaptive behavior of the loyal peers can exploit this asymmetry. For example, loyal peers could modulate the probability of acceptance of a poll request according to their recent busyness. The effect would be to raise the marginal effort required to increase the loyal peer's busyness as the attack effort increased. Second, we need to understand how our defenses against attrition work in a more dynamic environment, where new loyal peers continually join the system over time.
Conclusion
The defenses of this paper equip the LOCKSS system to resist attrition well:
• Application-level attrition attacks, even from adversaries with no resource constraints and sustained for 5 years, can be defeated with overprovisioning factors of 2-3, which are natural in our application. Further work may significantly reduce the need for overprovisioning.
• The strategy that provides an unconstrained adversary with the greatest impact on the system is to behave as a large number of new loyal peers.
• Network-level attacks do not affect the system significantly unless they are (a) intense enough to stop all communication by targeted peers, (b) widespread enough to target the vast majority of the peers, and (c) sustained over a significant fraction of an inter-poll interval.
Digital preservation is an unusual application, in that the goal is to prevent things from happening. LOCKSS resists failures and attacks from powerful adversaries without normal defenses such as long-term secrets and central administration. The techniques that we have developed may be primarily applicable to preservation, but we hope that our conservative design will assist others in building systems that better meet society's need for more reliable and defensible systems.
Both the LOCKSS project and the Narses simulator are hosted at SourceForge, and both carry BSD-style Open Source licenses. Implementation of this protocol in the production LOCKSS system will start shortly.
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